

# “When do Elites Favor Franchise Extension? Evidence from Japanese Attitude to Demeny Voting”

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# What is Demeny Voting?

- Parents of young children have extra votes equal to number of young children
- = Child has a vote + parents votes on child's behalf
- = Children's suffrage + proxy voting


# Past Suffrage Extensions

- Change in economic and social environment made franchise expansion beneficial to incumbent voters
  - Acemoglu & Robinson 2000."Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective," QJE
  - Lizzeri & Persico 2004"Why Did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, with an Application to Britain's "Age of Reform,"" QJE
  - Doepke & Tertilt, 2009. "Women's Liberation: What's in it for Men ?" QJE

# Recent Social and Political Change

- Intergenerational redistribution has become public policy
  - Pension
  - Public education
- Intergenerational redistribution is a political issue
- But not all members are represented in the political process (Preston effect)
- Leads to **children's suffrage** (Demeny Voting)

## Median Age of Population and Voters




# Demeny Voting


- Remedy the Preston Effect
  - Low fertility and longevity = aging age structure
  - Older voters dictate voter preference
- Make possible commitment to policies that benefit future (generation)
  - Eliminate “free riding” among current generation
- Benefits current generation

# Simulation

**Non-Demeny Voting  
Current System**



**Demeny Voting Rule**



# Survey 1 (Internet)

- December 29, 2011
- Voters (children, old children, no children)
- Questions on
  - Policies, political parties
  - Demeny voting
- Objectives
  - Preston effect ?
  - Policy and political party preference

# Survey 2 (Internet)


- Immediately before general election
  - December 14, 2012 (election was 16<sup>th</sup>)
- Voters + the young (16-19 year olds)
- Questions on
  - Policies, political parties
  - Demeny voting, Ministry of Future
- Objectives
  - Policy and political party preference of the young

# Survey 2 Respondents

Survey 1

Group		No. of respondents	Average age
A1	Voter, At least one child under 20	1030	40.16
A2	Voter, All children are adults	515	61.39
B	Voter, No child	515	37.59
C1	16–17 year olds	515	16.57
C2	18–19 year olds	515	18.63
	Total	3090	

### Opposition to Demeny Voting



## Survey 1

Break can be verified by  
“Quandt likelihood ratio” test  
in Time Series

Break occurs at T=20

Figure 1: Opposition to Demeny Voting and age of youngest child


Vaithianathan, Aoki and Sbai, 2012 “Support for Peaceable Franchise Extension:  
Evidence from Japanese Attitude to Demeny Voting”

- $E(Oppose) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 MinimumAge + \beta_2 AgeDummy^T$
- where  $AgeDummy^T = 1$  if  $MinimumAge \geq T$   
0 otherwise.

	Estimated coefficients
Minimum Age of Children	0.0031 (0.0002)
AgeDummy <sup>20</sup>	0.300*** (0.0491)
Constant	0.292*** (0.0222)
Observations	1545

Expected value for Oppose  
**0.292 before Age 20**  
**0.592 after Age 20**  
 (better than 0.1% significance)

### Most and 2<sup>nd</sup> Important Policy (excluding Economy, Employment)



Survey 1 Question: Which policy is most or 2<sup>nd</sup> most important ?

	Pension		Child-rearing Support		Education	
Variable	Coefficient	t-value	Coefficient	t-value	Coefficient	t-value
Civil servant						
Manager, COE	<b>-0.231</b>	<b>-0.53</b>	<b>0.0833</b>	<b>0.11</b>	<b>-0.282</b>	<b>-0.48</b>
Firm (clerical)	<b>-0.412</b>	<b>-1.17</b>	<b>0.708</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>-0.692</b>	<b>-1.54</b>
Firm (engineering)	<b>-0.317</b>	<b>-0.92</b>	<b>0.338</b>	<b>0.71</b>	<b>-0.872</b>	<b>-1.92</b>
Firm(other)	<b>-0.318</b>	<b>-0.87</b>	<b>0.435</b>	<b>0.86</b>	<b>-1.592**</b>	<b>-2.6</b>
Self employed	<b>-0.713</b>	<b>-1.81</b>	<b>0.46</b>	<b>0.82</b>	<b>-0.449</b>	<b>-0.91</b>
Independent professional	<b>-0.923</b>	<b>-1.32</b>	<b>0.906</b>	<b>0.99</b>	<b>-0.187</b>	<b>-0.23</b>
Full time housewife	<b>-0.164</b>	<b>-0.53</b>	<b>0.315</b>	<b>0.71</b>	<b>-0.830*</b>	<b>-2.11</b>
Part time employment	<b>-0.626</b>	<b>-1.7</b>	<b>0.199</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>-0.514</b>	<b>-1.16</b>
Student						
Other	<b>-0.413</b>	<b>-1.03</b>	<b>-0.217</b>	<b>-0.29</b>	<b>-1.208</b>	<b>-1.75</b>
Unemployed	<b>0.222</b>	<b>0.57</b>	<b>0.455</b>	<b>0.51</b>	<b>-1.355</b>	<b>-1.66</b>
Sex	<b>-0.124</b>	<b>-0.91</b>	<b>-0.113</b>	<b>-0.66</b>	<b>-0.293</b>	<b>-1.4</b>
Age	<b>.0368***</b>	<b>5.4</b>	<b>-0.123***</b>	<b>-10.46</b>	<b>-0.0247*</b>	<b>-2.26</b>
Number of children	<b>-0.288**</b>	<b>-3.07</b>	<b>0.286**</b>	<b>2.63</b>	<b>0.00902</b>	<b>0.07</b>
Constant	<b>-2.367***</b>	<b>-5.23</b>	<b>2.411***</b>	<b>3.84</b>	<b>-0.632</b>	<b>-1.00</b>

Table 17: Policy Choice Regression

\* 95%, \*\* 99%, \*\*\*99.99%

Aoki and Viathanathan, 2012 "Intergenerational Voter Preference Survey - Preliminary Results" CIS DP540

	Actual Results of 46 <sup>th</sup> General Election (Dec 16, 2012)				Survey Results	
	Total	Local	Proportional		Voters	16–19 yrs
社民 SDP	0.42	0.33	0.56		1.72	1.21
民主 JDP	11.88	9.00	16.67		11.96	17.79
自民 LDP	61.25	79.00	31.67		29.74	35.58
共産 Com	1.67	0.00	4.44		4.56	2.59
維新 Ishin	11.25	4.67	22.22		25.18	20.55
公明 Komei	6.46	3.00	12.22		4.03	4.84
みんな Min	3.75	1.33	7.78		13.28	8.81
幸福 Happiness	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.26	1.21
大地 Daichi	0.21	0.00	0.56		0.93	0.86
未来 Mirai	1.88	0.67	3.89		6.94	3.97
改革 Kaikaku	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.73	0.86
新日本 New Jp	0.00	0.00	0.00		0.20	0.00
国民 Kokumin	0.21	0.33	0.00		0.46	1.73
無所属 No aff	1.04	1.67	—	Total	100.00	100.00
諸派 Other	0.00	0.00	0.00	Not voting	9.47	31.17
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	Refuse	17.09	12.62

Reasons for objecting Demeny Voting	Not Object =Support	Unfair to those without childre n	Object to proxy voting	Parent may not vote on behalf of children	People will have children to have extra votes	Other	Total
	30% support						
Total	33.1	15.1	32.5	15.7	1.0	2.5	100
Voter, young child	35.6	15.2	32.6	14.3	0.6	1.7	100
Voter, adult child only	20.8	14.0	48.3	13.4	0.0	3.5	100
Voter, no child	23.1	20.2	34.6	18.1	1.0	3.1	100
16–17 year olds	45.0	14.6	19.0	17.1	1.9	2.3	100
18–19 year olds	38.6	11.7	28.0	17.1	2.1	2.5	100

## Voting Age

(%)	As Is (20and over )	Lower to 18 and older	Lower to 16 and over	Don't know	Total
30% support					
Total	61.0	31.8	3.7	3.5	100.0
Voter, young child	63.1	29.2	4.2	3.5	100.0
Voter, adult child only	58.6	39.2	1.0	1.2	100.0
Voter, no child	64.5	28.7	4.1	2.7	100.0
16–17 year olds	53.6	34.4	6.2	5.8	100.0
18–19 year olds	63.1	30.1	2.7	4.1	100.0

	Pension				
	Total	Increase	As is	Decrease	Don't know
age	3090	34.7	41.3	12.9	11.1
12~19	1029	31.8	42.3	13.2	12.7
20~24	81	30.9	37.0	8.6	23.5
25~29	142	31.7	43.7	12.0	12.7
30~34	253	33.6	41.9	10.7	13.8
35~39	317	36.6	37.2	13.9	12.3
40~44	317	37.5	32.8	17.0	12.6
45~49	261	36.0	43.3	14.2	6.5
50~54	205	42.0	33.7	13.7	10.7
55~59	165	35.8	41.8	17.6	4.8
60 +	320	36.3	53.4	5.9	4.4

	Consumption tax rate 5%				
	Total	Increase	As is	Decrease	Don't know
age	3090	26.2	60.3	10.0	3.6
12~19	1029	22.9	63.5	9.6	4.0
20~24	81	19.8	65.4	9.9	4.9
25~29	142	13.4	68.3	13.4	4.9
30~34	253	20.9	66.0	10.3	2.8
35~39	317	23.7	60.9	12.0	3.5
40~44	317	24.3	59.9	12.0	3.8
45~49	261	26.8	59.0	9.2	5.0
50~54	205	33.2	54.1	9.8	2.9
55~59	165	36.4	53.3	9.1	1.2
60 +	320	42.2	48.8	6.9	2.2


	Child-rearing subsidy				
	Total	Increase	As is	Decrease	Don't know
age	3090	27.7	41.1	23.8	7.4
12~19	1029	26.6	40.7	24.5	8.2
20~24	81	23.5	40.7	23.5	12.3
25~29	142	43.7	35.2	9.9	11.3
30~34	253	39.5	43.9	10.7	5.9
35~39	317	40.7	38.8	15.8	4.7
40~44	317	33.1	40.7	19.6	6.6
45~49	261	21.5	40.2	29.9	8.4
50~54	205	13.7	39.0	37.1	10.2
55~59	165	15.8	44.8	34.5	4.8
60 +	320	17.8	45.6	31.3	5.3

	Education (primary, secondary)				
	Total	Increase	As is	Decrease	Don't know
age	3090	41.7	44.3	8.5	5.5
12~19	1029	37.3	47.8	7.7	7.2
20~24	81	32.1	44.4	12.3	11.1
25~29	142	48.6	34.5	9.2	7.7
30~34	253	46.2	42.7	6.3	4.7
35~39	317	50.2	38.2	7.6	4.1
40~44	317	47.6	38.2	8.2	6.0
45~49	261	48.7	38.7	8.4	4.2
50~54	205	39.5	43.4	11.7	5.4
55~59	165	33.3	52.7	12.1	1.8
60 +	320	37.8	51.6	8.8	1.9

More support than  
child-rearing

## Pension

(%)	Increase	As is	Decrease	Don't know	Total
Total	34.7	41.3	12.9	11.1	100
Voter, young children	37.0	38.0	12.5	12.5	100
Voter, adult children	35.1	46.2	12.6	6.0	100
Voter, no children	35.5	41.4	13.0	10.1	100
16~17 year olds	33.8	41.2	12.6	12.4	100
18~19 year olds	29.7	43.3	14.0	13.0	100



Children do not make  
a difference

## Consumption tax rate 5%

(%)	Increase	As is	Decrease	Don't know	Total
Total	26.2	60.3	10.0	3.6	100.0
Voter, young children	25.0	61.8	10.0	3.2	100.0
Voter, adult children	38.1	52.4	7.4	2.1	100.0
Voter, no children	23.3	58.4	13.4	4.9	100.0
16~17 year olds	21.2	62.5	11.7	4.7	100.0
18~19 year olds	24.7	64.5	7.6	3.3	100.0

## Child-rearing subsidy

(%)	Increase	As is	Decrease	Don't know	Total
Total	27.7	41.1	23.8	7.4	100.0
Voter, young children	41.6	42.0	13.0	3.4	100.0
Voter, adult children	15.9	41.9	34.6	7.6	100.0
Voter, no children	13.8	39.2	33.2	13.8	100.0
16~17 year olds	27.4	41.7	21.6	9.3	100.0
18~19 year olds	26.0	39.6	27.4	7.0	100.0

Children are parents'  
responsibility ?

## Education (Primary, Secondary)

(%)	Increase	As is	Decrease	Don't know	Total
Total	41.7	44.3	8.5	5.5	100.0
Voter, young children	55.6	35.9	5.3	3.1	100.0
Voter, adult children	35.3	50.3	11.3	3.1	100.0
Voter, no children	29.3	48.0	13.6	9.1	100.0
16~17 year olds	37.1	47.6	7.0	8.3	100.0
18~19 year olds	37.5	32	8.3	6.0	100.0

More support than child-rearing subsidy

Grand-child ?	Pension				
	Total	Increase	As is	Decrease	Don't know
Yes	269	37.9	48.0	8.2	5.9
No	1276	36.1	39.2	13.5	11.3

Grand-child ?	Child-rearing subsidy				
	Total	Increase	As is	Decrease	Don't know
Yes	269	23.8	48.7	22.3	5.2
No	1276	35.0	40.6	19.7	4.7

Grand-child ?	Education (primary, secondary)				
	Total	Increase	As is	Decrease	Don't know
Yes	269	41.6	45.4	11.5	1.5
No	1276	50.4	39.7	6.4	3.4

# Summary

- Both **age** and having **children** matter
- Grand-children matters
  - Happy to support grand-children (public support of education and child-rearing not important)
  - Do not want to burden grand-children(expect public support in old age = **Free-riding** )

	Nuclear Power Generation					
	Total	Increase	As Is	Decrease but not 0	Zero	Don't know
age	3090	4.5	13.7	52.7	25.2	4.0
12~19	1029	5.9	16.5	52.6	18.7	6.3
20~24	81	2.5	22.2	51.9	14.8	8.6
25~29	142	1.4	17.6	52.8	23.2	4.9
30~34	253	1.6	13.4	61.7	19.0	4.3
35~39	317	5.0	10.1	50.8	29.0	5.0
40~44	317	6.3	14.2	47.6	29.0	2.8
45~49	261	3.8	11.9	48.3	34.5	1.5
50~54	205	3.9	13.2	52.7	28.8	1.5
55~59	165	3.6	12.1	51.5	32.7	0.0
60 +	320	3.4	6.3	56.9	33.1	0.3

	Science and Technology				
	Total	Increase	As Is	Decrease	Don't know
age	3090	42.3	42.1	7.0	8.7
12~19	1029	38.2	43.1	6.4	12.2
20~24	81	45.7	35.8	4.9	13.6
25~29	142	34.5	43.7	8.5	13.4
30~34	253	34.4	49.0	7.5	9.1
35~39	317	35.3	45.7	9.5	9.5
40~44	317	41.0	45.4	8.5	5.0
45~49	261	44.8	39.8	8.8	6.5
50~54	205	51.2	39.5	4.4	4.9
55~59	165	49.1	41.8	4.8	4.2
60 +	320	61.3	30.6	5.3	2.8

	Participation in TPP				
	Total	Support	Object	Not Sure	Don't know
age	3090	24.7	23.0	41.9	10.4
12~19	1029	15.5	30.9	39.1	14.6
20~24	81	13.6	24.7	44.4	17.3
25~29	142	18.3	17.6	49.3	14.8
30~34	253	20.6	19.4	44.7	15.4
35~39	317	19.6	24.9	44.5	11.0
40~44	317	31.9	17.0	44.5	6.6
45~49	261	31.0	20.7	44.1	4.2
50~54	205	31.2	23.4	38.5	6.8
55~59	165	35.8	15.8	43.6	4.8
60 +	320	45.9	11.9	39.4	2.8

ご清聴ありがとうございました

# References

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