

# Social pensions and public finances

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
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# Social Pensions

- Definition
  - non-contributory cash income given to older persons
- They can be very heterogeneous, with widely different effects
  - On individuals and other economic agents
  - On macroeconomic outcomes, such as aggregate savings and growth
  - On social outcome indicators, poverty and inequality
  - **On public finances**

# Illustration of diversity...

Countries with a social pension



Source: C. van Dullemen (2007)

# Outline

1. Key dimensions of social pensions
2. What is the role of financing?
3. Contributory pensions?
4. How does this all add up in the face of individual decision-making?
5. Summary

# 1. Social pensions: key dimensions

- Why intervene?
  - Survival, growth, education, “decent” living?
  - Reduce poverty, inequality?
- Coverage
  - Universal (thus, tax-financed Beveridgean system)
  - Targeted (on need, resources, etc.)
  - But, even pure age targeting raises questions!
    - Why elderly are more worthy of intervention?
    - Problem of rigid age-cutoffs: see many developed countries’ pension systems!

# 1. Social pensions: key dimensions

- Magnitude
  - Sizable element of the system
  - “Marginal”
- How they integrate with other programs applicable to the old, public and private
  - Cumulative
  - Exclusive

**both cost and effects depend heavily on specifics!**



## 2. What is the role of financing?

- Generally, social pensions are tax-financed
- Perspective: current revenues...
  - e.g., x percent of GDP can be a hard-to-achieve goal
- ... and future revenue challenges
  - Trade tax revenue declining
  - Tax competition on corporate taxes
  - Increasing role of indirect taxes

**Tax revenue could be costly to obtain!**

# Tax Trends in SSA Countries by Income Level, 1980-2005


(source: IMF staff compilation)






# Main Components of the Tax/GDP Ratio in SSA Countries, 1980-2005



(source: IMF staff compilation)



**Figure 9. Eastern Europe: Average CIT and PIT  
(unweighted)**



# Composition of Tax Revenues in NMS-10 and CIS, average



# Application : Is there room for a “social” VAT?

- Unclear if intention to make imports and all factors of production support part of the social programs...
- Complicated GE dynamics
- Analysis often focused on developed countries
  - Redistribution from consumers (young/old) to beneficiaries
- Developing countries?
  - Further analysis needed as VAT systems often work differently, and some key sectors not taxed
  - Needs thorough redistributive analysis including effect on consumption, taxes and income!

# 3. Contributory public pensions

- Two extreme situations
  - Contributory Beveridgean
  - Contributory Bismarckian

# 3. Contributory public pensions

- “Social insurance” can be synonymous of large degree of coverage...
  - In developed countries, often a large to universal coverage of workers...
  - ...and many inactive individuals too.
- ...but also of largely selected coverage limited to some narrow groups, particularly in LIC
  - Public sector employees
  - Formal private sector employment
  - “Informal” sector is excluded! (>40% in SSA)
- Degree of crowd-out will depend on these!

# 3. Contributory public pensions

- Many advanced contributory pension schemes have features of social pensions!
  - Quasi-universal benefits such as the AOW pension in the Netherlands
  - Minimum benefits irrespective of currency value of contributions
  - Imputed coverage for missing or reduced years: studies, unemployment, disability, maternity, child-raising, etc
- and not infrequently, budgetary transfers!

# 3. Contributory private pensions

- Similar...
  - Contributions link: often under the form of earnings linkage
  - Preferential tax treatment of contributions AND/OR benefits
- and yet different.
  - Public pensions (fund) often PAYG
    - on a non-sustainable path (viability?)
    - static deficits, dynamic issues (in face of rapid aging)
  - Private pensions often funded (huge variety... with own set of problems)



## 4. How does this all add up in the face of individual decision-making?

- Benefit linkage is key
  - Plays in each decision maker's problem
    - E.g., insurance premia versus taxes
  - Social pensions can reduce or destroy the benefit linkage of the contributory system
  - Can reduce the incentive to formalize, at
    - Level of employee
    - Level of employer
- Impact on budget will depend on individuals' reactions! (example Belgian early retirement)

# E.g.: Early retirement in Belgium

Figure 1: Early retirement - Men





Figure 2: Early retirement - Women



# How does this all add up in the face of individual decision-making?

- Implications for public finances?
  - Likely to be far-reaching
  - Static
    - Shift costs of old-age towards taxpayer
    - Less reliance on private and contributions-based approach
    - Likely to imply worsening of short-term fiscal balance
  - Dynamic
    - Disincentives to save and/or contribute and/or pay taxes
    - Implicit government liabilities on rise while revenues might be under threat
    - Behavioral reactions of individuals will enhance purely mechanical effects
    - Other growth effects? Unclear whether pensions is the right tool, as other more direct levers might exist...

# Conclusions

- Static numbers likely to underestimate cost to public finances.
- Endogenous decisions of individuals will be key drivers.
  - Parallel with literature on incentives to retire
  - Welfare/workfare literature
- Similar considerations applicable in context of population-wide social assistance programs.